A Hotelling-Downs Game for Strategic Candidacy with Binary Issues

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


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Motivation

- Candidates in elections can be strategic in order to win (or to have somebody else, that they prefer, win).
- A common model to capture this strategic behavior is the **Hotelling** -**Downs** model, where the *political spectrum* is represented by the real line.



- ► Seeing politics as a matter of *right or left* on a line seems quite reductive.
- ▶ We will model political opinions by positions for or against a certain predefined set of binary issues. e.g.
 - b higher taxes (T)
 - ▶ immigration (I)
- > raising the retirement age
- ▶ euthanasia (E)

- ▶ Do candidates have an incentive to *deviate* from their truthful opinion? How will they act strategically in this setting? Do we have stable states?

Related Concepts in the Literature

- Strategic candidacy
 - candidates can abstain, aiming to get a better winner.
- Hotelling-Downs model
- strategic positioning of selfish players on a spatial dimension.
- Facility location problems
 - optimum location of a new facility w.r.t. a given metric space.
- Voronoi games
 - strategic positioning of players on a metric space, maximizing the amount of points closest to them.


The Model

- ► **Hypercube** of *all possible opinions* over the binary issues.
- A voter's opinion is represented as a position in this hypercube (and so, each vertex has an associated weight of voters with such an opinion).
- Candidates will run for the election by announcing an opinion that they (supposedly) stand for.
- ► They may be willing to strategize (i.e. announce an untruthful opinion) to get a better outcome from the election.
 - ▶ Their *payoff* is determined by a fixed preference they have over the other candidates (in which they always strictly prefer themselves).




- ▶ These preferences might even be narcissistic (indifferent among the rest).
- ► Winner of the election is decided by a variant of the plurality voting rule:
 - ▶ Each voter gets 1 vote, which is divided equally among the closest candidates.
 - deterministic tie-breaking rule:






Restrictions to the Setting


Single-peaked distribution of voters: There is a most popular opinion (peak) such that, the more we walk away from it, the less voters we find.



Candidates' strategy sets: Candidates may only be willing to announce a subset of all possible positions. This set may be assumed:



► A Ball around the truthful position.



Solution Concepts


- ble state with respect to unilateral improving deviations from candidates.
- ▶ Nash equilibrium (NE): sta-▶ t-Local equilibrium (t-LocEq): state with respect to unilateral improving deviations from candidates to positions at distance $\leq t$ from the current one.

Existence of a Local Equilibrium: Negative Result

In general, no guarantee of existence of a 1-LocEq even with 2 candidates and 3 issues.


→ Deciding about the existence of a t-LocEq is NPhard, for all $t \geq 2$.

What about t = 1? (open)



2 Candidates: Unrestricted Voter Distribution

► Majoritarian outcome: the position that takes the majoritarian value on each issue separately.




Guaranteed existence of 2-LocEq for 2 candidates, odd number of voters, and if they both can take the majoritarian outcome.

 \rightarrow no such guarantee for a 3-LocEq (under the same conditions).

2 Candidates: Single-Peaked Voter Distribution

► Guaranteed existence of a NE with 2 candidates, under a single-peaked distribution of voters, when the candidate favored by the tie-breaking can take the peak position.




- ▶ In particular, there always exists a NE with 2 candidates under a uniform distribution.
- → No guarantee for a 1-LocEq with 3 candidates (with *fixed* preferences) and 2 issues, even under a uniform distribution.

2 Candidates: 1-Local Equilibria and Candidates Strategies

Guarantee of existence of a 1-LocEq with 2 candidates whenever:

- ▶ the strategy set of the candidate ¶ favored by the tie-breaking contains the strategies of the other candidate \\ \bar{\pi}\ .
- can follow to her position and eventually attain a 1-local eq.
- ▶ the strategies of the candidates are balls of radius 1.
- → No guarantee of existence of a:
- ► 2-LocEq even when candidates' strategies are balls of radius 1 with 2 candidates and 3 issues.
- ► 3-LocEq even for 2 candidates with the same strategies.

Experiments on Synthetic Data (5000 Voters, Random Balls)



Perspectives and Future Work

- ► Other voting rules?
- ► Consideration of abstention?
- Correlation between positions?
- Strategic behavior from both voters and candidates?
- Increasing the score instead of a better winner?